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In 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act was passed in order
to promote competition, provide more customer options, and
encourage efficiency in the passenger airline industry. It
was envisioned that without restrictive and outdated
government regulations, new competitors would enter the market
and incumbent carriers would be invigorated. The public would
be the beneficiary of lower fares and more frequent flights.
However, after approximately ten years of deregulation,
unanticipated changes in the passenger airline business have
caused various government and private interest groups to re-
evaluate current laissez-faire policies and propose new
regulations.
In 1989, Senators John McCain, R-Ariz., and John Danforth,
R-Mo., introduced the Airline Competition Enhancement Act.
Appendix A contains a copy of this proposed legislation.
According to Senator Danforth, "...th[is] bill would eliminate
barriers to entry and anti-competitive practices that are
keeping airlines from providing the public quality air
transportation at a reasonable price." [Ref. l:p. 4]
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B. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the major issues
in the passenger airline industry and determine if the
proposed Airline Competition Enhancement Act would favorably
impact these issues. It will include a summarization of the
history of airline regulation and examine the factors that are
contributing to the call for re-regulation, such as hub-and-
spoke routing, computer reservation systems, code-sharing, and
industry concentration. The information contained in this
analysis will be drawn from recent government and commercial
publications and periodicals.
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II. AIRLINE REGULATORY POLICY
A. AIRLINE REGULATION FROM 1926 TO 1978
At first, government involvement in aviation was primarily
directed at supporting the Postal Service. In 1926, the Kelly
Act empowered the U.S. Postmaster to enter contracts with
commercial airlines for Airmail service. The Watres Act of
1930 required all commercial carriers to adhere to regulations
set forth by the Postmaster General. The Postmaster General
proceeded to exceed his authority by rigging competitive bids
and accepting side payments when disputes arose [Ref. 2:p.
81]. The resulting scandal created the Air Mail Act of 1934,
which transferred fare determination and entry to the auspices
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Additionally, two
land mark accidents which took the lives of football coach
Knute Rockne (1931) and Senator Bronson Cutting (1935), caused
new interests in safety regulations.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 established the Civil
Aeronautics Authority (changed to the Civil Aeronautics Board
in 1940). The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was made
responsible for setting economic controls over rates and
operating routes. It was also responsible for enforcing
safety rules, testing pilots and aircraft, air traffic
control, and accident investigations. Since 1939 was the
3
first accident-free year in a decade, the new federal safety
regulations were validated.
The next major piece of legislation was the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958. It created the Federal Aviation Agency
to promote the economic development of aviation. It also
granted the CAB broader authority in setting route and rate
constraints on carriers in order to correct inequities and
inefficiency. In 1966, the Federal Aviation was renamed the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and incorporated into
the new Department of Transportation.
Strict regulation continued throughout the 1960's and
early 1970's. A series of Congressional hearings in the
1970's vented problems with airline regulatory policy.
Proponents of deregulation argued that,
... although the CAB set trunk airline fares
at high, 'cartel' levels, the potential profits
from these fares [were] competed away through
frequency and service quality competition on the
part of the airlines. As a result, the airlines
[did] not gain profits from the regulation, and the
consumer [was] left paying a fare much higher than he
would prefer.... [Ref. 2:p. 95.]
Critics feared that deregulation would lead to instability and
a higher concentration of the dominant airlines [Ref. 3:p.
327]. These hearings led to the 1977 appointment of Alfred
Kahn to head the CAB for the purpose of dismantling the
economic regulatory system. Kahn's initial changes promoted
the entry of lower fare carriers and increased price
4
competition. The purpose of this new permissiveness was to
encourage new entries and competition into an industry that
many felt had become stagnant under 40 years of regulation.
However, the deregulatory movement was such a potent force in
the government environment that Kahn's initiatives culminated
in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
B. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
On 24 October 1978, President Carter signed the Airline
Deregulation Act as an amendment to the twenty year old
Federal Aviation Act. The main focus of the Act was the
reform of the rate structures and routing. It did not
deregulate safety legislation. Its major provisions were:
- The elimination of the "zone of reasonableness" rate
restrictions which had formerly set ceilings (5-10% above
standards) and floors (50% below standards) that carriers
could not exceed [Ref. 3:p. 327).
- The elimination of long-haul discrimination standards
that required fares be set on an escalating scale based on
distance.
- The elimination of profit impact tests that had been
used as a basis for approving proposed discount fares by
measuring their impact an industry-wide profits.
- The elimination of a fixed fare ratio between first
class and coach service.
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- The loosening of route restrictions which enabled
carriers to apply for dormant routes on a first-come-first-
served basis.
- The guarantee of "essential air service" to small
communities already being served at the time of deregulation.
- The guarantee of unemployment benefits for non-
management employees laid off during the initial transition
to deregulation.
- The maintainance of preference, prejudice, and
discrimination bias as a justification for finding a fare
unlawful.
From 1978 to 1985, the CAB iresided over the
implementation of the above mentioned provisions. The final
provision of the Deregulation Act was to arrange for the CAB's
own dissolution. The CAB's few remaining responsibilities
were transferred to other agencies such as the Department of
Transportation, the U.S. Postal Service, and the Justice
Department. In 1985 the CAB was disbanded.
Proponents of deregulation anticipated that the new
freedoms would bring about the following positive results
[Ref. 3:p. 182]:
- Overall lower fares
- Open competition
- A wider variety of service options
6
- Greater efficiency and lower costs
- Elimination of excess capacity
- Continued financial viability
- Increased innovation
C. ASSESSMENTS OF THE DEREGULATION ERA
At the conclusion of the first decade of deregulation,
numerous assessments were made concerning deregulation's
impact on the airline industry. One of the leading
spokespersons for the opponents of deregulation is Melvin
Brenner, an airline consultant with over 40 years of
commercial and government experience. In his 1988 article,
"Airline Deregulation - A Public Policy Failure," Brenner
claims that deregulation has failed to live up to its promise
in the following areas [Ref. 4].
There is a concensus between opponents and proponents that
competition has not bloomed as anticipated. Brenner states
that the six leading carriers controlled 71% of industry
traffic in 1978 and 79% of the traffic in 1987, thus there is
less competition and a higher concentration. The advantages
of large carriers (computerized reservation systems, the
capacity to last-out price wars, frequent flyer incentives,
etc.) have effectively restrained the entry of small carriers
into the national market.
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Brenner concedes that there has been a decline in overall
fare prices, but that the decline is a continuation of pre-
deregulatory trends brought about by improvements in
technology. He also claims that there is a wide disparity in
pricing, based not on service, but on what the market will
bear and the major airline's ability to undercut regional
competition by undercutting marginal costs.
With the rapid development of the hub-and-spoke system,
scheduled flights have increased at hubs located in large
cities and shown a slight decrease in small cities. The small
community's loss has been offset by the wider array of
destinations offered via hub connections. Brenner finds fault
with the congestion and delays these changes have made.
Brenner states that there has not been a sharp decrease in
costs since deregulation. Labor costs have decreased, but
operating costs have increased due to a shift to smaller
aircraft and the extension of routes.
Not surprisingly, one of the leading proponents of
deregulation is Alfred Kahn. In his 1988 article, "Airline
Deregulation - A Mixed Bag, But a Clear Success Nevertheless,"
Kahn summarizes why he believes deregulation has had an
overall positive effect (Ref. 5].
Kahn concedes that the industry is more concentrated, but
this is more than offset by the greater variety of options
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available to the public. He also contends that many of the
concentration problems that resulted from bankruptcies,
mergers, and acquisitions, were not caused by deregulation,
but by the government's failure to enforce antitrust laws.
He cites the overall decline in fares and the introduction
of bargain fares as a direct result of the more competitive
deregulatory era. These new options made flying more
accessible to the general public.
Kahn asserts that increased competition has caused an
industry-wide shake out, but that it was long overdue. He
believes that remaining problems can be rectified by the
enforcement of existing consumer protection and antitrust
laws, and that re-regulation would be disasterous.
Congressional activists have added fuel to this debate by
introducing the Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1989.
D. THE AIRLINE COMPETITION ENHANCDIENT ACT OF 1989
The proposed Airline Competition Enhancement Act is not a
call for a return to the strictly controlled regulatory system
that was in effect prior to 1978. Instead, it is an attempt
to reduce the power of the airlines that have been dominating
the market since deregulation. The following is a synopsis
of its main proposals.
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1. Computer Reservation Systems
This section would require airlines to divest
themselves of their Computer Reservation Systems (CRS), and
it would prohibit code-sharing.
2. Dominant Air Carriers
The second major proposal states that,
An air carrier operating aircraft at a concentrated
hub airport shall be presumed to have been engaged
in unfair or deceptive methods of competition in
air transportation...if the carrier is a dominant
air carrier at that airport. [Ref. 6:p. 3]
3. Injunction Authority
The third part of the proposal grants the Secretary of
Transportation authority to enjoin any carrier or ticket agent
engaged in unfair practices, if such practices are believed
to be detrimental to the public interest.
4. Passenger Facility Charges
This section would allow concentrated hubs to assess
a fee from passengers enplaning at their airports in order to,
".. .generate revenue for security, capacity enhancement, and
noise mitigation projects." [Ref. 6:p. 5] Each assessment
would require the Secretary of Transportation's approval.
5. Slot Allocations
The last major proposal would require that all slots
at high density airports be re-auctioned within 180 days of
the bill's signing. It further provides for limiting the
10
length of slot contracts and the imposition of minimum useage
requirements.
Airline regulatory policy and its impact have been the
subject of scholarly analysis and emotional public debate.
As in the past, current regulatory proposals have been
introduced in an effort to maintain the economic health of an
industry that is a vital part of the nation's infrastructure.
The next chapter will analyze the major issues that are
affecting the airline industry and examine whether the
proposed legislation might resolve the problems.
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III. MAJOR ISSUES IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 ignited an era of
growth and turbulance that was fueled by the application of
new technology and aggressive management practices. Code-
sharing, computer reservation systems (CRS), hub-and-spoke
routing, and tighter concentration significantly changed the
environment of the industry. These new factors created
effects that were not anticipated and that have helped to
swing momeitum back in the direction of re-regulation.
A. CODE-SHARING
1. Background
Code-sharing is a system whereby regional or commuter
airlines make a contractural agreement with a large airline
to share its two letter CRS designator number. For example,
a flight from Monterey, CA to Washington DC, via San
Francisco, may show an American Airlines designator code for
both flight segments, when in actuality, the first segment of
the trip may be on a Wings West commuter flight. Table 1




MAJOR CARRIERS" CODE-SHARING AGRED(ENTS - 1988
TexsAir USAir
Air Midwest Air Kentucky













Executive Air Charter Comair
Metro Express II Sky West
Nashville Eagle
Simmons
Wings West Trans World











Source: (Ref. 7:p. 191]
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This system is advantageous to the large airline in that they
can claim they cover more destinations, and they can siphon-
off commuter traffic arriving at major airports more
effectively. This is accomplished by incorporating the
cities served by the commuter airline into the parent
airline's destination inventory, and then co-ordinating flight
schedules so that code-sharing connections are the most
efficient for the traveler. Likewise, the commuter airline
gains a larger percent of traffic and a secure niche at a
major airport. This symbiotic relationship is being
criticized by the government, non-code-sharing airlines, and
the traveling public for several reasons.
2. Problems with Code-Sharing
Code-sharing reduces competition. Non-code-sharing
regional airlines find it difficult to challenge established
carriers, because travelers prefer all segments of a flight
to be on one carrier in order to ease connection hassles. The
traveler may be annoyed to discover his single-coded flight
is actually a multi-carrier flight, but there is little
incentive to change bookings. In order to reduce consumer
deception in code-sharing, the Department of Transportation
issued a new ruling in September 1985. It requires published
schedules to identify the regional carriers in code-sharing
14
flights and it requires travel agents to verbally notify
passengers when they are being booked on a code-sharing flight
[Ref. 8:p. 414].
Since flights are listed on a CRS screen according to
elapsed travel time and how closely the flight matches the
departure time requested by the traveler, major airlines can
work with their code-sharing partners to schedule connections
that are more efficient. This practice gives an airline a
more dominant position on the CRS screen.
Another problem with code-sharing is that smaller
code-sharing regional airlines are no longer competing with
the larger airlines for long-haul flights. This lack of
aggressiveness has reduced competition by inhibiting
challenges from smaller airlines with growth potential.
Code-sharing has ignited a flurry of lawsuits citing
unfair competition, breach of service agreements, and
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A typical suit
involved Northwest Airlines and a mid-western regional airline
called Fischer Brothers [Ref. 6:p. 193].
Fischer was a reputable and financially secure
business when it entered into a five year code-sharing
contract with Northwest. When Northwest merged with Republic
airlines it ended up with redundancy in its feeder flights due
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to Republic's code-sharing agreement with Simmons Airlines.
Fischer proposed a new feeder arrangement which would tap new
markets and not conflict with the Simmons routes. Northwest
gave Fischer's plan to Simmons and then terminated Fischer's
contract by invoking a six month escape clause. This case is
now in the courts. Fischer was forced to sell out to Midway
Airlines and start over again with two nine-passenger
aircraft.
Code-sharing did not originate with deregulation [Ref.
8:p. 405]. Advantageous flight scheduling has been a sound
management practice for decades, but CRS has amplified the
anti-competitive aspects of the system. Up until 1986, code-
sharing contracts proliferated. Many commuters eagerly
entered contracts, but others signed on reluctantly, fearing
that to remain independent would be a slow death. In 1986,
the saturation point for partnerships was reached and a
culling process began. More and more, the survival of the
regional or commuter airline is linked to the solidity of its
contract with the majors [Ref. 7:p. 191].
3. Proposed Legislation's Impact on Code-sharing
The proposed Airline Competition Enhancement Act would
prohibit airlines from code-sharing. Proponents of re-
regulation contend that the elimination of code-sharing will
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reduce the unfair marketing advantages of dominant carriers.
Proponents of code-sharing argue that close coordination of
schedules, leasing adjacent gates, and joint marketing efforts
are beneficial to the consumer.
The elimination of code-sharing would purify CRS
listings by differentiating between airlines. Furthermore,
it would eliminate the rigid, exclusionary contracts between
major and regional carriers. Regional airlines have become
so dependent on the majors for their survival that, "...no
commuter/regional airline has ever survived after being cut
loose from a major partner." [Ref. 7:p. 190] On the other
hand, the benefits of controlling the regionals is so
important to the majors that they have obtained equity
positions in 18 out of the 51 regional carriers with code-
sharing agreements [Ref. 7:p. 190]. Regional airlines who
were hurt by code-sharing often brought suit against the
majors, but with limited financial resources, they were at a
distinct disadvantage and often dropped their case.
The elimination of code-sharing contracts would help
to open competition among regional carriers, but code-
sharing's infrastructure is so deeply intertwined in each
hub's operation that it will require substantial enforcement
efforts to insure that the change is not superficial. The few
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scheduling benefits of this system could be maintained through
the informal cooperative marketing arrangements that existed
before code-sharing.
B. COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS
1. Background
Primitive forms of CRS first appeared in the 1960's,
but with the rapid growth in computing power and speed, the
airlines were able to develop effective, real-time computer
reservation systems for use in travel agencies by the mid
1970's. Since CRS was still in its infancy during the push
for deregulation, it was not an issue of contention; however,
its phenomenal growth in scope and importance to the airlines
has prompted the attention of those who favor re-regulation
[Ref. l:p. 5].
Table 2 lists the five computer reservation systems
currently dominating the travel industry. The airline
provides the subscribing travel agency with the terminal(s),
software, communications network, training, and other options.




AIRLINE COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTMS
System Airline Share of CRS Market (Aug 86)
SABRE American 34 %
APOLLO United 25 %
SODA Eastern 17 %
PARS TWA 13 %
DATAS Delta 11%
Source: [Ref. 9:p. 33]
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Travel agents book a flight by entering pertinent data
into the terminal and advising the customer of the best
options listed. Once the customer has made his choice, the
tickets and boarding pass are printed at the agency, which
reduces check-in delays at the airport.
Information concerning the booking and the customer is
kept on file at the travel agency and transmitted to the
airline's central processing system where the data is used for
adjusting fares, flights, and marketing strategy.
Travel agents write between 80% and 90% of all airline
tickets, which is up from 37% in the pre-deregulation year of
1978 [Ref. 10:p. 88]. This is mainly attributed to the
increasing complexity of fare pricing and the overall increase
in non-business passengers.
There have been two attempts to build a single
universal CRS that would impartially serve the needs of
airlines and consumers. In the mid 1970's a group of travel
agencies considered building their own system. This was
vehemently opposed by airlines and quickly collapsed. The
airlines then proceeded to form their own consortium for the
same purpose, but internal disagreements and the threat of
anti-trust action defeated this effort [Ref. ll:p. 179].
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2. American Airlines' SABRE
American Airlines' SABRE is the largest, most
sophisticated CRS. A detailed examination of its scope helps
to explain why it is also the most frequent target for
criticism from re-regulators. SABRE (Semi-Automated
Business Research Environment) is the world's largest
privately owned, real-time computer network. The first
incarnation of SABRE was as a basic, in-house reservation
system. It evolved into an international reservation system
and extensive travel agency automation network that is powered
by seven IBM mainframe computers located in a $35 million high
security, underground facility near Tulsa, Oklahoma [Ref.
12 :p. 109]. Table 3 is a profile of SABRE's transaction
capacity as of June 1989.
SABRE offers a wide range of services to travel
agents. In addition to reservations there is an expanding
office automation and telecommunications function. A summary
of these features is listed below [Ref. 9:p. 1].
a. Schedules and Reservations.
This provides schedules and seat availabilities,
as well as additional information, such as Department of




SABRE TRANSACTION CAPACITY (JUNE 1989)
Agency and Corporate Locations 14,500
Fares Listed 45 million
Airlines w/schedules in SABRE 647
Hotel chains listed 140
Rental car companies listed 46
Tour companies listed 35
Peak-hour usage 1,885 msg/sec
Peak-day usage 68.9 million msg
Source: [Ref. 12:p. 1]
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b. Pricing.
SABRE guarantees the accuracy of its prices and
provides a "Bargain Finder" feature that scans the system to
find the lowest possible fare. The terminal will also print
out a listing of all fares available from the highest to the
lowest for the benefit of the customer. There is also an in-
depth listing of current pricing rules and regulations.
c. Documentation.
The SABRE system prints tickets and boarding
passes at the travel agency office. There is also a Satelite
Ticket Printer (STP) that enables tickets to be printed at
remote locations for corporate clients. It also provides an
itinerary which includes air, hotel, car, tour, and insurance
information in an easy-to-read format.
d. Automated Management System.
SABRE provides the travel agent with electronic
files and editing capability on a wide variety of customer
data, such as addresses, invoice remarks, and historical
usage. It can generate productivity reports, track
commissions, measure trends, and produce income-revenue
statements. Since the system uses an IBM PS/2, SABRE also
offers optional word processing, spreadsheet, database
management, and electronic mail software.
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e. Travel.
In addition to airline reservations, SABRE also
provides a similar scope of service for car rentals, hotel
reservations, and tours.
f. Miscellaneous Services.
Other travel related services and products include
SABRE Travel Guide, SABREFAX, Telex, Cablegrams, Mailgrams,
currency exchange rates, florist services, theater tickets,
and a weather service.
g. EAASY SABRE.
EAASY SABRE enables the corporate client or home
personal computer user to access the SABRE flight listings.
This is currently a "view only" feature. The customer must
make the reservation through their travel agent or the
airline.
SABRE owes much of its success to American's
aggressive development policy and innovative thinking. In
1986, American's parent company, AMR, created a subsidiary
called Airline Automation Services which markets SABRE-based
systems to other airlines. Its customers have included Pan
Am, All Nippon, Braniff, Southwest and a number of commuter
airlines. Additionally, expertise gained in handling massive
amounts of data through telecommunications systems resulted
24
in the spin-off subsidiary, American Airlines Direct Marketing
Corporation. It generated $40.1 million in revenues in 1986
and is now one of the world's largest telemarketing
operations.
3. Problems with CRS
CRS technology, like SABRE, has been a boon to travel
agents and the airlines, but its influence on the industry has
been so extensive that it has attracted controversy.
a. CRS as a Source of Marketing Information.
One of the basic assumptions of a perfectly
competitive market is that, "...each participant must have
perfect knowledge of all market conditions and possibilities."
[Ref. 13:p. 282] When an airline has its own CRS, it has
access to to all the information concerning customer
preferences generated by the ticket/travel sales. This
enables the airline to develop sophisticated yield management
systems which can predict booking trends on specific flights
and effectively maximize revenues. The computer does not
instigate price or schedule changes based on this data. These
decisions are still made by management. An airline, like
American, is also able to monitor a competitor's booking
trends by analyzing the competitor's flights booked through
SABRE. With this situation, airlines that do not have their
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own CRS do not have access to the same knowledge as their
competitors.
b. Profiteering.
CRS has been a very lucrative investment. The
airlines obtain revenues in two ways. Each travel agent pays
between $5,000 and $15,000 per year in subscriber fees and
each reservation on a flight other than on the vendor's
airline results in an average charge of $1.85 per flight
segment [Ref. 9:p. 33]. In 1987 and 1988, SABRE and United
Airlines' Apollo garnered $450 million in booking fees [Ref.
14:p. 22]. "SABRE accounts for 5% of the gross revenues of
the AMR Corporation ...but earns more than 15% of its
profits." [Ref. 13:p. 82] AMR expects these percentages to
rise to 25% from gross revenues and 40% from profits [Ref.
9:p. 33]. These substantial profits are partially offset by
the high cost of initial investments. American incurred a
$350 million negative cash flow between 1976 and 1982. This
cost was directly attributed to SABRE start-up costs [Ref.
15:p. 82].
c. Bias.
Bias is the most troubling and persistent
criticism of CRS. Since the main criterion for being listed
first on a CRS screen is the elapsed time from origin to
destination, the shorter the time, the higher an airlines
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flight is listed. When transfers are required, airlines with
code-sharing contracts will minimize connection times to
obtain a higher listing [Ref. 8:p. 412]. If a flight can be
broken down into two or more segments, the airline owning the
CRS will program an artificially high transfer time for
competitors connecting flights. SABRE penalizes interline
transfers by up to 90 minutes [Ref. 8:p. 412]. Another CRS
will list interline transfers only after all of their code-
sharing flights have been listed [Ref. 8:p. 412) Since the
CRS screen only lists three flights at a time, there is a
bias in favor of the CRS-owning airline.
There are also complaints that travel agents are
biased in selecting flights. CRS does require a "minimum use"
quota and there are substantial penalties for switching from
one airline's system to another. It has also been estimated
that 70% to 90% of computer reservations are made from the
three choices that appear on the first display screen and 50%
are made from the first line displayed. [Ref. 8:p. 410]. This
is not necessarily a case of bias or laziness on the part of
the travel agent. The listing at the top of the first screen
should be the best, given the customer's requirements,
however, it does reinforce the need for the listing to be
unbiased.
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4. Proposed Legislation's Impact on CRS
The proposed Airline Competition Enhancement Act would
require airlines to divest themselves of their CRS. Its
intended effects and possible repercussions are listed below.
a. Market Knowledge
Proponents of the new legislation argue that if
airlines were forced to divest, the currently restricted
market knowledge could be made available to all airlines, thus
eliminating an unfair advantage. However, "perfect
competition" is a theory that does not translate into free
market reality. The use of computers is considered a fair
competitive strategy in all industries. Risking capital on
systems (such as CRS) that enhance a company's share of the
marketplace is also a legitimate practice. It is managerial
expertise that ultimately decides the success of a company.
American was willing to absorb the 350 million dollar
negative cash flow between 1976 and 1982 in order to have
SABRE [Ref. 9:p. 33]. Small airlines, which cannot afford to
incur that type of financial strain, are holding their own by
vigilently managing their smaller, specialized market share.
Unless the industry is strictly re-regulated, equal access to
knowledge is not possible.
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b. Bias
Biases within the system are grounds for concern,
but not a justification for CRS divestiture. A fine-tuning
of existing anti-bias rules can circumvent listing problems.
Travel agent quotas and penalties are legitimate business
practices, and if they are considered separately from screen
biases, they do not pose an unfair advantage or threat to
competition.
c. Profits
In testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science
and Transportation's Aviation Subcommittee, Robert Crandall,
CEO of Americin Airlines stated, "The message I hear (from
pro-regula*r s) is that we are free to be innovative, free to
risk capital, (and) free to compete as long as we lose money,
(but) if we are successful, the rug is likely to be pulled out
from under us." [Ref. 16:p. 15] Considering the highly
transitory nature of technological advantages and fluctuating
profit margins, the current successes should not be penalized.
To see divestiture as a cure for bias is an
oversimplification that ignores the complex chain reactions
that would be set-off by such a move. The major airlines
would gain from the initial divestiture and lowered research
and development costs, but the long term loss of revenue and
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the cost of obtaining yield management data would lead to
higher fares in order to maintain a positive profit margin.
C. HUB-AND-SPOKE SYSTEMS
1. Background
Whereas forms of CRS and code-sharing were in
existence prior to 1978, the burgeoning hub-and-spoke system
is more directly correlated to changes following the
Deregulation Act. Under regulation, carriers applying for a
new route had to prove to the CAB that "...the public would
benefit from the proposed service and that airlines already
serving these routes would not be adversely affected." [Ref.
17:p. 210] The CAB used this power as a means to insure
stability and provide financial opportunities for weak
carriers. This practice reached its peak in the early 1970's
when the CAA declared a new route moratorium and haulted
competition in order to revive sagging revenues.
This system did have anti-competitive aspects.
Applicants had to demonstrate a history of competency before
being granted a new route. This was not possible for new
airlines. Between 1950 and 1974, the CAB rejected all 79
route applications submitted by new interstate airlines
[Ref. 17:p. 210].
The CAB's route moratorium ended in 1975 and
restrictions were gradually loosened. They began to allow
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free entry unless incumbents could prove that the new route
was not in the public interest. Route authorizations
quadrupled in the first 18 months of deregulation [Ref. 17:p.
211]. This new freedom set the ground work for the hub-and-
spoke system.
In adopting the hub-and-spoke method, carriers sought
to improve efficiency by changing flight patterns on low
volume routes. Instead of flights being scheduled on a city-
to-city network, high traffic/centrally located airports were
designated as hubs. Figure 1 provides a diagram of this
change. Smaller cities feed passengers to the hub for
consolidation flights and siphon off hub passengers on the
return flights to the small cities.
This system benefits the carriers by increasing the
passenger density of long haul flights, which, in turn, lowers
unit costs. By concentrating service and maintenance support
at hub airports, there are additional savings. Meanwhile, the
small city passenger reaps the benefits of a wider variety of
destinations. Possible negative effects include congestion
problems during peak hours and an underutilization of
personnel at satellite airports due to reduced activity
levels. When the positive and negative effects are
quantified, the results indicate that for each one per cent
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FIGURE 1
COMPARI SON OF LINEAR AND HUB-AND-SPOKE ROUTE SYSTEM
The Linear Route System
The Hub-and Spoke Route System
Source: [Ref. 17 :p. 213]
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increase in hubbing, there has been an .11% decrease in unit
costs [Ref. 17:p. 221].
2. Problems with Hub-and-Spoke Routing
Critics of hub-and-spoke routing contend that it is
anti-competitive and creates congestion. Since landing slots
and gate space at major hubs are being fully utilized under
long term contracts, new entrants must wait for vacancies or
the construction of new facilities. When new competitors do
break into a hub, they are further constrained by the
incumbent airlines' domination of routes and economy of scope.
The airport congestion problem that developed in the
1980's is a result of airport construction lagging behind
increases in passenger traffic. The hub-and-spoke system
further exacerbated the problem by promoting more frequent
flights in order to increase the possible connection
permutations. The interdependence of these networks created
chain reaction delays during peak hours.
3. Proposed Legislation's Impact on Hub-and-Spoke Systems
a. Facility Charges
The Airline Competition Enhancement Act proposes
passenger facility charges as one means to diminish the cost
of congestion. This spreads the cost burden to the public,
but does not discourage the volume or scheduling of traffic.
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A more effective solution for congestion would be
to change the current landing fee structure. Presently, fees
are assessed on the basis of aircraft weight. When airports
were uncongested, this system was logical in that it was
assumed that larger planes could more easily afford the cost.
However, this weight assessment system no longer deters
congestion. The FAA estimates that, "...additional passenger
time and aircraft operating costs caused by congestion
approach $5 billion annually." [Ref. 18:p. 709] If landing
fees were based on the delay costs incurred by other users and
the airports, there would be a significant increase in airport
revenues. Table 4 illustrates this point. This would deter
commuter airlines and general aviation from using airports
during peak hours.
b. Slots
The Competition Enhancement Act's plan to
redistribute slots is an attempt to break the formidable
control exercised by the dominant carriers. Many long-term
lease for slots were signed prior to deregulation as a means
of insuring that the carriers would stay long enough to
justify municipal expenditures [Ref. 19:p. 60]. Majority-
in-interest clauses in these leases allow carriers to veto
construction of new slots in order to protect their market
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TABLE 4
ANNUAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF OPTIMAL RUNWAY PRICING
(1988 DOLLARS)





Affected Component in 1977
Carrier operating costs 1.23 .41
Passenger time costs 3.62 1.20
Landing fees (11.58) (5.41)
Passenger priced out of the
market (0.95) (0.41)
Airport revenue and costs 11.50 5.36
Total 3.82 1.15
Source: [Ref. 18:p. 709]
35
share [Ref. 19:p. 60]. Thus, even if the municipality had the
funds and need to expand, incumbent carriers could prevent it
for parochial reasons.
A complete re-auction of slots may be more
draconian than is necessary. Most of the long-term leases
will be expiring in the coming decade and airport authorities
are intent on negotiating shorter five to ten year leases that
do not contain majority-in-interest clauses [Ref. 19:p. 62].
In this area, the industry is self-correcting. Legislation
that prohibits exclusivity would help to reinforce municipal
interests and open slots to competitive bidding without the
disruption of wholesale re-auctioning.
D. INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION
1. Background
In 1978, 71% of the industry's traffic was handled by
only six of the major carriers [Ref. 20:p. 84]. The Airline
Deregulation Act sought to reduce the dominance of major
airlines and distribute the concentration of market power over
a wider variety of incumbent and new entry carriers.
Prior to 1978, mergers were not approved unless the
airline being acquired was facing bankruptcy. Deregulation
removed these merger barriers and the result was an
unprecedented series of mergers. Table 5 lists these mergers.
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TABLE 5
CARRIERS MERGED OR ACQUIRED (1978 - 1988)
Carrier Comments
Air Cal into American
Air Florida into Midway
Braniff (Latin American) into Eastern, then Texas Air
Britt into People Express, then Texas Air
Continental into Texas Air
Eastern into Texas Air
Empire into Piedmont, then US Air
Frontier into People Express, then Texas Air
Henson into Piedmont, then US Air
Hughs Air West into Republic, then Northwest
Jet America into Alaskan
National into Pan American
New York Air into Texas Air
North Central into Republic, then Northwest
Ozark into TWA
Pan Am (Pacific Division)into United
PBA into People Express, then Texas Air
People Express into Texas Air
Piedmont into US Air
PSA into US Air
Ransome into Pan American
Southern into Republic, then Northwest
Transtar into Southwest
Western into Delta
Source: [Ref. 19:p. 185]
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Mergers are attractive to the airlines because economies of
scale have distinct advantages such as:
The ability that their vast networks gives [the]
giants to feed traffic onto their own flights at the
hubs they dominate;
...the enormous competitive advantages they have
achieved through the development and exploitation of
their own computerized reservation systems....
...the superior attractiveness of their frequent
flyer programs;
... the effectiveness with which they have learned
to meet the uniform low fares of much lower-cost
competitors like People, selectively, with even more
deeply discounted fares restricted to seats that would
otherwise go out empty;
...their superior ability to last out price wars.
[Ref. 20:p. 189]
Mergers enabled carriers to achieve a "critical mass"
necessary to thrive under the more aggressive atmosphere of
deregulation [Ref. 4:p. 188].
Under deregulation, the CAB was the final authority
for approving mergers. When it disbanded in 1985, the
Department of Transportation assumed this role. During the
first ten years of deregulation, mergers proliferated with
virtually no interference from CAB/DOT. This was due to the
leniency of the Reagan administration regarding business
consolidations [Ref. 21:p. 36]. On 1 January 1989, merger
approval was transferred to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
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[Ref. 21:p. 34] It is not anticipated that there will be any
significant increase in antitrust action unless prompted by
mergers that would cause significant overlapping in the hubs
and "...major barriers to entry for a replacement of the
merged carrier." [Ref. 21:p. 37] This is due to the fact that
the continuing Republican regime tends to be pro-business and
anti-interference [Ref. 21:p. 36].
2. Problems vith Industry Concentration
a. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
The Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a
measurement used by DOT and DOJ to decide whether or not to
approve a merger. An explanation of how this index is
calculated is contained in Appendix B. A score below 1,000
is considered a low concentration; 1,000 to 1,800 is
considered moderate; over 1,800 is a high concentration.
The problem with th- index is that the figure used
to calculate a carrier's HHI is based on an industry-wide
share, not the local airport share. This lowers the HHI by
spreading a carrier's enplanements over a wide range while
disregarding pockets of dominance. As a result, the HHI
measurement indicates that the industry today is only
moderately concentrated. Table 6 illustrates this point.
However, if the HHI were applied to individual hubs, 40 out
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TABLE 6
CONCENTRATION OF LEADING AIR CARRIRS
% of Industry
Carrier Passenger Miles I





Pan American 9.1 82.81
885.77 (Low)
1987








of 50 would be considered highly concentrated with a weighted
average of 3,531 per hub. [Ref. 22:p. 131]
b. Contestability
When the framework for deregulation was set, there
was a general assumption that the airline industry would be
a contestable market [Ref. 19:p. 59]. It was expected that
dominant carriers would be prevented from exercising
monopolistic pricing due to the competitor's ability to enter
this barrier-free market with lower prices. In 1978,
Department of Transportation Secretary Jim Burnley stated,
The airline business is very different from
many other businesses. It is inherently dynamic.
An entry into a new.. .market often requires little
more than the shuffling of equipment, in other words
airplanes, and leasing of gates at airports."
[Ref. 19:p. 59]
This has proven not to be the case.
Formerly mentioned barriers, such as code-sharing,
CRS, long-term slot leases, and economies of size have been
effective in stunting the growth of many upstart carriers
[Ref. 4:p. 185]. However, this does not mean that majors are
invulnerable. Table 6 compares the major carriers before
deregulation and nine years later [Ref. 4:p. 187]. Although
the number remained constant, two new carriers were able to
supplant previous members, which indicates that the industry
is not stagnating and appears to be contestable.
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3. Proposed Legislation's Impact on Industry
Concentration
The Airline Competition Enhancement Act's assumption
of unfair practice if a carrier is dominant at a hub would
have a major impact. The hubs to be included under this
provision would have a HHI of over 1,800. Dominant carriers
would be those with more than 40% of the enplanements at the
hub [Ref. 6:p. 4]. Table 7 lists the hubs and carriers that
would most likely be affected.
This provision would prompt an industry wide shake-
down. All of the major airlines would be forced to reduce
flights at one or more hubs. The drafters of the legislation
assume that this would increase new entries, especially if
slots were simultaneously being re-auctioned.
The good intention of lowering barriers will
inevitably set off intense competition. Industry analysts are
predicting the first quarter of 1990 will show an operating
loss due to a 40% increase in fuel prices since August 1990
[Ref. 23:p. 54]. If Congress were to inject competition
during a down turn, the negative consequences would be
amplified.
Overall, the reduction of carrier dominance through
lowered entry barriers has merit, but in order to implement
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TABLE 7
DOMINANCE OF INDIVIDUAL CARRIERS AT PRINCIPLE RUBS
(1986)
Dominant MarketHub Airport HUI =Xa Share
Charlotte 6,713 Piedmont* 79%
Salt Lake City 5,671 Delta 76%
Dallas/Ft. Worth 4,500 American 63%
Atlanta 4,468 Delta 55%
Dayton 4,417 Piedmont* 64%
St. Louis 4,402 TWA 83%
Houston (IAH) 4,077 Texas Air 72%
Pittsburgh 3,562 US Air 82%
Minneapolis 3,555 Northwest 79%
Denver 3,015 Texas Air 47%
United 42%
Houston (Hobby) 2,953 Southwest 69%
Chicago (O'Hare) 2,836 United 44%
Baltimore 2,695 Piedmont* 59%
Newark 2,395 Texas Air 65%
Detroit 2,151 Northwest 68%
* Piedmont has since merged into US Air.
Sources: [Ref. 4:p. 190, and Ref. 22:p. 82)
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it without harming the industry, Congress would have to
legislate additional regulations that would constrain
destructive price wars. This invasive form of supervision is




There have been several recent rulings and reports that
indicate the federal government will continue to support
deregulation.
In February 1990, the Secretary of Transportation
released a task force report, "Competition in the U.S.
Domestic Airline Industry" [Ref. 24:p. 1]. It concluded that
deregulation is working and that the advantages of more
service at lower costs have far outweigh the pocket problems
of congestion and uneven benefits to the public.
In February 1990, the Secretary of Transportation also
published his national transportation policy strategy
entitled, "Moving America, New Directions, New Opportunities"
[Ref. 25]. It did not contain any specific initiatives, but
did call for an increase in state and local taxes and more
federal spending. This increase in taxes is a potentially
awkward situation, since the federal Aviation Trust Fund had
$6.85 billion in uncommitted funds at the end of 1989 [Ref.
26]. The money for this fund comes from various aviation
taxes and is used for improvements to aviation facilities,
equipment, and research [Ref. 25:p. 55] It is a potentially
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awkward situation because Congress and airline officials are
hesitant to raise taxes with such a large amount of
uncommitted money being held in reserve. It is generally
believed that the money in the Trust Fund is not being
committed because it is being used to help meet the Graham-
Rudman-Hollings budget targets [Ref. 27:p. 28]. The Secretary
of Transportation concedes that there is money in reserve, but
that the, ". ..total uncommitted balances represent
significantly less than one year of Federal spending...."
[Ref. 25:p. 55].
In December 1989, a federal jury rejected antitrust claims
brought against United and American Airlines. Several
carriers had accused the two majors of monopolizing the
computer reservation systems business. United and American
also won a series of cases that claimed their contracts with
travel agents were unfair and unreasonable [Ref. 28:p. 1].
In February 1990, the Department of Transportation
dismissed anti-competitive charges brought by Texas Air and
Northwest against American. This case concerned screen bias
and minimum use clauses in the SABRE network [Ref. 28:p. 1].




The following changes to the proposed Airline Competition
Act are recommended:
- Eliminate code-sharing agreements in order to encourage
initiative among commuter airlines and eliminate the
exclusivity of code-sharing arrangements.
- Do not force CRS divestiture, but bias problems should
be corrected. As for profits, the airlines should not be
penalized for their success and innovativeness as long as
their benefits are not obtained through unfair practices.
- Eliminate the prohibition against facility charges.
They will help to raise revenue and be a tool for controlling
congestion. Revenues raised through facility charges and
other usage fees must be committed to improving the
infrastructure. The Aviation Trust Fund should not be held
hostage to the Graham-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Plan.
- Abolish long-term leases and majority-in-interest claims
in order to make the distribution of slots more equitable.
This less severe version of the Act is more apropos to the
current political climate and would still provide much needed
reforms. The government would be providing the framework for






To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to increase competition among
commercial air carriers at the Nation's major airports, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER 6 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 18), 1989
Mr. MCCAIN (for himself, Mr. DANFORTH, and Mr. BOND) introduced the follow-
ing bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation
A BILL
To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to increase compe-
tition among commercial -air carriers at the Nation's major
airports, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SHORT TITLE
4 SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Airline Coin-
5 petition Enhancement Act of 1989".
6 COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS
7 SEC. 2. Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
8 (49 App. U.S.C. 1371 et seq.) is amended by adding at the
9 end the following new section:
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2 "(a) NONDISCRIMINATORY AccEss.-The Secretary of
3 Transportation shall ensure that computer reservation sys-
4 tems are available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all air car-
5 riers, ticket agents, and other persons.
6 "(b) PROHIBITION. -After January 20, 1991, no air
7 carrier or air carrier affiliate shall own, operate, or control a
8 computer reservation system.
9 "(c) CODE SHARING.-After the date that is ninety
10 days following the date of enactment of this section, an air
11 carrier-
12 "(1) shall not share or authorize the sharing of its
13 designator code with another air carrier for computer
14 reservation purposes or any other purpose; and
15 "(2) shall not, with respect to any flight for which
16 it is responsible, use or permit the use of the designa-
17 tor code of another air carrier to identify such flight for
18 any purpose.
19 "(d) REGULATIONS.-The Secretary shall prescribe
20 such regulations as the Secretary determines appropriate to
21 carry out this section.
22 "(e) DEFINITIONS.-In this section, the term-
23 "(1) 'air carrier affiliate' means any person who,
24 directly or indirectly, owns or controls an air carrier or
25 is owned or controlled by an air carrier;
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1 "(2) 'computer reservation systems' means any
2 computerized or automated system which has the abili-
3 ty to allow a ticket agent, air carrier, or other person
4 to-
5 "(A) obtain information on routes, arrival
6 and departure schedules, and fares of flights of air
7 carriers; and
8 "(B) make reservations on flights of air carri-
9 ers or issue tickets for an air carrier; and
10 "(3) 'designator code' means the unique designa-
11 tion code allotted to an air carrier by the Secretary of
12 Transportation.".
13 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AUTHORITY
14 "SEc. 3. Section 5(a)(2) of the Federal Trade Commis-
15 sion Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2)) is amended by striking "air
16 carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the Federal Avia-
17 tion Act of 1958,".
18 DOMINANT AIR CARRIERS
19 SEC. 4. Section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act of
20 1958 (49 App. U.S.C. 1381) is amended by adding at the end
21 the following new subsection:
22 "DOMINANT AIR CARRIERS
23 "(c)(1) An air carrier operating aircraft at a concentrat-
24 ed hub airport shall be presumed to have been engaged in
25 unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition
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1 in air transportation (or the sale thereof) if the air carrier is a
2 dominant air carrier at that airport.
3 "(2) In this subsection, the term-
4 "(A) 'concentrated hub airport' means an airport
5 that has 0.25 per centum or more of the total annual
6 enplanements in the United States and that is deter-
7 mined by the Secretary of Transportation to exceed
8 1800 on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as measured
9 in terms of market shares of passenger enplanements
10 on all air carriers other than charter air carriers; and
11 "(B) 'dominant air carrier' means an air carrier
12 whose aircraft at a concentrated hub airport have 40
13 per centum or more of the passenger enplanements at
14 the airport or an air carrier which is one of two air
15 carriers whose aircraft at a concentrated hub airport
16 together have 60 per centum or more of the passenger
17 enplanements at the airport; and
18 "(C) 'Herfindahl-Hirschman Index' means the nu-
19 merical index of market concentration calculated by
20 adding the squares of the individual market shares of
21 all the firms in a market.".
22 INJUNCTION AUTHORITY
23 SEC. 5. Section 411(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of
24 1958 (49 App. U.S.C. 1381(a)) is amended-
25 (1) by inserting "(1)" immediately after "(a)"; and
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1 (2) by adding at the end the following new para-
2 graph:
3 "(2) If the Secretary of Transportation has reason to
4 believe that any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent
5 has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or
6 unfair methods of competition in air transportation (or the
7 sale thereof) and that enjoining such practices or methods
8 would be in the interest of the public, the Secretary may
9 bring suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin
10 such practices or methods. Any such suit shall be brought in
11 the district in which the air carrier, foreign air carrier, or
12 ticket agent resides or transacts business.".
13 PASSENGER FACILITY CHARGES
14 SEC. 6. Section 1113 of the Federal Aviation Act of
15 1958 (49 App. U.S.C. 1513) is amended-
16 (1) by redesignating subsection (d) and any refer-
17 ence thereto as subsection (e);
18 (2) in subsection (a), by striking "No" and insert-
19 ing in lieu thereof "Except as provided in subsection
20 (d) of this section, no"; and
21 (3) by inserting immediately after subsection (c)
22 the following new subsection:
23 "(dX1) Subject to the requirements of this section, the
24 operator of any concentrated hub airport may, to generate
25 revenue for security, capacity enhancement, and noise miti-
.52
1 gation projects at such airport, assess a charge on passengers
2 enplaning at such airport.
3 "(2) No charge may be assessed under this section
4 unless the Secretary of Transportation has determined, after
5 notice and an opportunity for a hearing, that the proposed
6 assessment is in the public interest and in accordance with
7 the public convenience and necessity.
8 "(3) The Secretary of Transportation may issue such
9 regulations as the Secretary determines are appropriate to
10 carry out the provisions of this subsection.
11 "(4) In this section-
12 "(A) 'concentrated hub airport' means an airport
13 that has 0.25 per centum or more of the total annual
14 enplanements in the United States and that is deter-
15 mined by the Secretary of Transportation to exceed
16 1800 on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as measured
17 in terms of market shares of passenger enplanements
18 on all air carriers other than charter air carriers; and
19 "(B) 'Herfindahl-Hirschman Index' means the nu-
20 merical index of market concentration calculated by
21 adding the squares of the individual market shares of
22 all the firms in a market.".
23 SLOT ALLOCATIONS
24 SEC. 7. (a) No later than one hundred eighty days after
25 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Trans-
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1 of part 93 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, to pro-
2 vide for the withdrawal and transfer, by auction, of slots held
3 by air carriers and foreign air carriers at high density traffic
4 airports.
5 (b) The final rule required to be implemented under sub-
6 section (a) shall be designed to enhance competition by en-
7 couraging the new entry of air carriers at high density traffic
8 airports and shall-
9 (1) provide for the periodic auction of such slots
10 for specific lengths of time;
11 (2) require that the holder of a slot make a speci-
12 fled minimum percentage of use of the slot and that if
13 the holder fails to meet such minimum use require-
14 ment, the slot shall be returned to the Secretary of
15 Transportation;
16 (3) include provisions designed to limit market
17 concentration at high density traffic airports;
18 (4) take into account the responsibilities of the
19 Secretary of Transportation with respect to small com-
20 munity air service under section 419 of the Federal
21 Aviation Act of 1958 (49 App. U.S.C. 1389) and the
22 international law and treaty obligations of the United
23 States; and
24 (5) include such other provisions and requirements
25 as the Secretary determines to be in the public interest
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1 and in accordance with the public convenience and
2 necessity.
3 (c) The proceeds from any auction under the final rule
4 required to be implemented under this section shall be cred-
5 ited to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund established by
6 section 9502 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26
7 U.S.C. 9502), to be used for projects to enhance airport
8 capacity.
9 (d) As used in this section-
10 (1) the terms "air carrier" and "foreign air carri-
11 er" have the meaning given those terms in section 101
12 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 App. U.S.C.
13 1301); and
14 (2) the term "high density traffic airport" means
15 any airport so designated under subpart K of part 93
16 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, including any
17 airport so designated following the date of enactment





The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a generic formula
used for measuring industry concentration. It is calculated
using the following formula:
n
HHI= Si=l
where Si is the market share of the ith firm.
A maximum value of 1 is obtained when there is a pure
monopoly. When n increases, the value declines. Squaring
market shares puts more weight on the large firm than the
small. For example, if a city had only two competitors, but
one had only 5% of the market, the HHI would be calculated as
follows:
HHI = .052 + .952 = .905
where .05 and .95 are the companies' respective market shares.
The HHI close to 1 indicates a near monopoly in spite of the
presence of two firms. On the other hand, if the smaller firm
had a 40% market share, the HHI would be:
HHI = .402 + .602 = .520
which indicates a healthier competitive environment
[Ref. 29:p. 58].
The airline industry calculates HHI slightly differently.
They change the decimal point so that a 40% market share is
expressed 4A%, not .4Q as above. Under this method, n = 100%
and a monopoly is 10,000. On this scale, the following
standards were set:
MaI Degree of Concentration
Below 1,000 low
1,000 to 1,800 moderate
Over 1,800 high
56
The airline industry's method is not necessarily an accurate
depiction of an airlines' dominance since concentrations are
not measured by airport or region, but by an airline's
nationwide market share. For example, if a regional airline
wanted to buy a small commuter service, it might end up with
an airport HHI of near monopoly level, but if nationally it
only had 2% of the market, it could not be denied merger
authority based on concentration. [Ref. 22:p. 131].
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